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WIND-ENERGY VENTURES IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
FASHIONING A FUNCTIONAL PARADIGM
Crystal D. Masterson*
I. Introduction
A wind turbine located in the pastoral setting of an Indian reservation is
likely to engender two disparate reactions. Some may view the wind turbine
as existing in harmony with nature on account of its attributes as a renewable
energy resource serving to combat the effects of climate change. Others may
find themselves revisiting their childhood, humming a familiar tune and
chanting, "One of these things is not like the other." Whatever the case may
be, wind turbines have already begun to appear in Indian Country and are
likely to continue to do so in the wake of heightened pressures to reduce
carbon emissions and dependence on foreign oil. Such widespread expansion
is achievable and salutary, provided that certain steps are taken to facilitate the
economic viability of wind-energy projects on tribal lands.
This comment endorses the establishment of wind-energy projects on
Native American land as a means both of promoting tribal economic self-
determination and diversifying the national energy portfolio. Part II of this
comment provides an overview of wind energy, explaining the logistics
involved in launching a wind project, as well as the benefits realized through
production of this type of energy. Parts III and IV consider the benefits and
setbacks, respectively, to wind-energy projects in Indian Country. Part V
examines the system currently in place, under which it is possible to establish
Native American wind projects. Part VI espouses a more favorable
framework, under which it becomes feasible to conquer the hurdles currently
inhibiting wind-energy projects on tribal lands. This comment concludes in
Part VII.
I. Overview of Wind Energy
A. How It Works
1. The Nature of Wind Energy
Wind power is generated through a conversion of solar energy.' Solar
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality-Finding Ways to Site
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radiation, upon reaching the earth, heats the terrain at rates that differ based on
variable land surfaces and day/night alternation.2 The imbalanced atmospheric
warming causes warmer air to rise and cooler air to occupy the resultant low-
pressure areas, thus creating wind.'
Surface winds are captured in the form of kinetic energy by the rotating
blades of a wind turbine.' The blades of the turbine are attached to a shaft, and
the shaft is attached to a generator.' As the blades of the turbine rotate, so too
does the generator, converting the kinetic energy of the wind into electrical
energy.'
Wind turbines typically are observed in large utility-scale groupings known
as wind farms. But apart from these large installations, homes, farming
cooperatives, and small communities can erect what is commonly termed a
"distributed wind system" consisting of a single turbine or small collection of
turbines.' Wind farms are intended for widespread power distribution and are
thus invariably interconnected to the transmission grid.' Distributed wind
systems, on the other hand, provide on-site power, either on a stand-alone
basis or through a grid-connected configuration, in which the systems "are
interconnected to existing local power distribution lines."'
2. Preliminary Requirements for Erecting a Wind Farm
Four preliminary steps must be completed before embarking on the
construction phase of a wind farm: (1) a wind-resource assessment, (2) an
ethnographic study, (3) an ecological study, and (4) the "courting" of private
investors.'0 The results of the various studies, coupled with the ability to
Wind Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 635, 649 (2008) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Finding Ways].
2. Id
3. Id.
4. Kamaal R. Zaidi, Wind Energy and Its Impact on Future Environmental Policy
Planning: Powering Renewable Energy in Canada andAbroad, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK
J. 198, 204 (2007).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Avi Brisman, TheAesthetics of WindEnergy Systems, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 43 n.94
(2005).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Patrick M. Garry et al., Wind Energy in Indian Country: A Study ofthe Challenges
and Opportunities Facing South Dakota Tribes, 54 S.D. L. REv. 448, 451 (2009). While the
cited source may impliedly posit an order by which these steps are to be undertaken, there is not
necessarily an inherent hierarchy among the steps. It may very well be most prudent to pursue
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obtain private investors, determine the feasibility of siting a wind turbine or
wind farm in a given location.
By its nature, wind is a variable resource. Wind turbines are capable of
producing electricity only when the wind blows." Not only does the wind
need to blow, but it must do so at relatively high speeds to make a proposed
wind project attractive.' 2 Wind turbines do not begin to produce electricity
until a minimum wind speed is reached-typically nine to ten miles per hour.'3
Because wind power has a cubic relationship to wind speed, even a modest
increase in speed can substantially increase energy production.' 4 For example,
"if the wind speed increases from 10 miles per hour to 20 miles per hour - a
doubling in speed (2 x) - then the resulting increase in power is cubed (2 x
2 x 2), or eight times the power of the original wind.""
There is a limit, however, to desired wind speeds. Wind turbines are
designed and manufactured such that they shut down when encountering wind
speeds in excess of fifty-five to sixty miles per hour in order to safeguard
against damage or destruction." The ideal speed for optimal wind production
is twenty-five to thirty miles per hour"-a number that seems strikingly high
when one considers the average wind speeds in most of the country. For
example, Chicago (dubbed the Windy City) boasts an average annual wind
speed of 10.3 miles per hour," barely reaching the threshold required for
turbines to begin producing electricity. It is therefore imperative to locate
wind farms in the relatively limited selection of sites enjoying consistently
high wind speeds.'9
private investors before conducting any studies, as the results of such studies would prove
immaterial without entities willing to invest in the project. The steps are intended to serve as
a list of preliminary requirements, rather than as a chronological roadmap.
11. Jeffry S. Hinman, The Green Economic Recovery: Wind Energy Tax Policy After
Financial Crisis and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, 24 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 35, 45 (2009).
12. See Dwight H. Merriam, Regulating Backyard Wind Turbines, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 291,
301 (2009).
13. Id. at 294.
14. Shannon L. Ferrell, Wind EnergyAgreements in Oklahoma: Dealing with Energy 's New
Frontier, 80 OKLA. B.J. 1015, 1016 (2009).
15. Id.
16. Merriam, supra note 12, at 294.
17. Id.
18. Wind- Average Wind Speed-(MPH), http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/online/ccd/
avgwind.html (last visited June 7, 2010).
19. See PatriciaE. Salkin & Michael Donohue, Planning& Zoningfor Wind Power in New
York, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 1, 2.
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Recognizing the magnitude of even a slight change in wind speed, one can
appreciate the prudence and necessity of conducting a thorough wind-resource
assessment. The purpose of the assessment is to ascertain whether ample wind
speed exists at a proposed location. 20 In a wind-resource assessment, the
property owners grant access to the developers to conduct wind-resource
studies.2 1 These studies typically involve gathering wind and meteorological
data and serve to determine a proposed project's technical and economic
feasibility.22
If a proposed location contains adequate wind resources, the next step
involves conducting an ethnographic study to determine whether a proposed
project location features any cultural significance.2 3 An ethnographic study
"identifies the customs and beliefs of a people."24 Such studies are vital to
proposed wind projects on tribal lands because a tribe's "subsistence, culture,
and spirituality are intimately connected to the lands they inhabit."25 If a
proposed location is of cultural or religious significance, the tribe must weigh
the importance of financial gain against the preservation of specific cultural
resources.
Upon completion of the ethnographic study, an ecological study must be
performed. The purpose of the ecological study is to ascertain whether local
wildlife would be adversely impacted.26 Because of their sheer size, wind
projects "unavoidably displace[] a certain amount of flora and fauna."27 As a
result, the goal of the ecological study becomes one of mitigation28-to
assuage and minimize the potential negative environmental consequences
accompanying a proposed wind project.
The final step to launching a new wind project is to acquire private
investors. Considering the capital-intensive nature of a wind-energy project,29
coupled with the pervasive poverty saddling many Native American
20. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 451.
21. Mustafa P. Ostrander, Wind Power: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing Landowners,
Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 2007, at 24, 26.
22. Id.
23. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 451.
24. Id. at 453.
25. Jacqueline P. Hand, Global Climate Change: A Serious Threat to Native American
Lands and Culture, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10329, 10330 (2008).
26. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 451.
27. Id. at 453.
28. Id.
29. See Kevin L. Shaw & Richard D. Deutsch, Wind Power and Other Renewable Energy
Projects: The New Wave ofPower Project Development on Indian Lands, ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. FOuND. Special Ed., Nov. 2005, at ch. 9.
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communities, this step becomes particularly relevant to tribal ventures.30 It is
estimated that the installation of one megawatt of turbine capacity requires
approximately $2 million of up-front capital." Bearing in mind that a
common project size contains one hundred megawatts of capacity,3 2 the
importance of obtaining private investors with sizeable wealth at their disposal
soon becomes clear.
B. Benefits of Wind Energy
Wind power has been sanguinely hailed as the energy source of the future. 3
Its proponents assert that wind energy provides an attractive and viable
solution to the problems encumbering traditional energy sources.34 Three
primary factors driving the growth of renewable energy are the environmental
concerns surrounding global warming, energy-infrastructure security, and the
promotion of rural economic welfare.
1. Climate Change
On average, one megawatt hour of electricity produced by means of
traditional energy sources produces emissions of 1341 pounds of carbon
dioxide, 7.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide, and 3.55 pounds of nitrogen oxides.36
Wind energy, by contrast, produces zero emissions.3 ' Bearing in mind that
annual United States electricity production exceeds four billion megawatt
30. See Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and
the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REv. 290, 362 (2009) (noting the difficult economic decisions
faced by often-impoverished tribes).
31. Ferrell, supra note 14, at 1017.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Brisman, supra note 7, at 6 n.11.
34. See Kathryn Wiens, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc.:
Encouraging WindEnergy Production While Protecting the Public Trust, 32 ENVIRONS: ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y J. 389, 390 (2009).
35. See Kelsey Jae Nunez, Comment, Gridlock on the Road to Renewable Energy
Development: A Discussion About the Opportunities & Risks Presented by the Modernization
Requirements ofthe Electricity Transmission Network, 1 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 137,
141 (2007).
36. Corey Stephen Shoock, Note, Blowing in the Wind: How a Two-Tiered National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, a System Benefits Fund, and Other Programs Will Reshape
American Energy Investment and Reduce Fossil Fuel Externalities, 12 FORDHAM J. CoRP. &
FIN. L. 1011, 1025 (2007).
37. Dorothy W. Bisbee, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring Emission
Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 349, 350 (2004).
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hours,38 the pollution statistics for traditional energy sources are staggering.
Reduced emissions, however, do not represent the sole environmental
advantage gained via wind-energy production. Statistics pertaining to water
savings rival those of reduced emissions in magnitude. Every megawatt hour
of wind energy that replaces traditional energy sources could potentially save
up to six hundred gallons of water.39 Replacing twenty percent of annual
United States electricity production with wind energy could thus save four
trillion gallons of water by 2030.40
Climate change is of particular concern to Native Americans, as its impacts
can weigh especially heavily on tribal economies.41 Tribal economies
commonly center on agriculture, natural resources, and tourism, all of which
suffer direct adverse affects as a result of natural disasters and other events
associated with climate change.4 2 Additionally, Native Americans "may be
unable to relocate if their climates become inhospitable" due to the ravaging
effects of global warming.43 Native American tribes "are place-based entities
whose subsistence . .. [is] intimately connected to the lands they inhabit.""
Even a slight change in climate has the potential to "cause the migration or
extinction of culturally important species if their habitat . . . [is] no longer
suitable."' 5 In short, "Indian tribes have little opportunity to follow the
migrating species because tribes are often tied to specific parcels of land"
created by treaty or other agreement.4 6
The effects of climate change burden every member of society, but the
negative impacts on tribal entities cut much more deeply as a result of their
relationship with the lands they inhabit. Accordingly, Native Americans are
likely to be further incentivized to participate in renewable-energy projects,
which serve effectively to reduce emissions and, in turn, prevent depletion of
vital environmental, cultural, and economic resources.
38. Alexandra B. Klass & Sara E. Bergan, Carbon Sequestration and Sustainability, 44
TULSA L. REv. 237, 240 (2008).
39. Elizabeth Burleson, WindPower, National Security, and Sound EnergyPolicy, 17 PENN
ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 137, 140 (2009) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY
2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY'S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 17 (2008), available at http://www.20percentwind.org/Final DOEExecutive_
Sununary.pdf [hereinafter 20% WIND ENERGY]).
40. See id. (quoting 20% WIND ENERGY, supra note 39, at 17).
41. Hand, supra note 25, at 10330.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
322 [Vol. 34
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2. National Security
Energy concerns related to national security are twofold. The first concern
involves uneasiness about America's dependence on foreign oil.47 Many fear
that such dependence undermines national security by "tying the U.S.
economy to unstable and undemocratic nations, thus increasing the risk of
military conflict in political hotspots around the globe."48 Wind power,
however, is a domestically available resource.49 Bearing in mind conventional
notions of supply and demand, any increase in domestic wind production
consequently leads to a decrease in energy imports, effectively bolstering
national security."o
Second, concerns surround the vulnerability of the United States' aging
transmission grid." As a result of its interconnected properties and
overstressed condition, the transmission grid is susceptible to an intentional
attack, which could have far-reaching consequences when one considers the
nature of the grid itself.5 The grid's interconnectedness "allows for the
transmission of power over large distances, [but] it also implies that local
disturbances propagate over the whole grid."" An intentional attack on a
single point in the grid could thus result in a devastating power outage
reminiscent of the August 2003 blackout, the largest power failure in North
American history, which left 40 million Americans and 10 million Canadians
without power and cost the United States up to $10 billion.54
A present investment to construct transmission capacity could forestall the
monumental losses associated with large-scale power failures. Instead of
paying enormous curative costs, the government could build more
transmission lines, thereby taking a preventative rather than a remedial
approach to energy security. In addition to reducing the risk of blackouts,
47. See Nunez, supra note 35, at 145.
48. Id. (quoting WORLDWATCH INST., AMERICAN ENERGY: THE RENEWABLE PATH TO
ENERGY SECURITY 8 (2006), available at http://images l.americanprogress.org/il80web20037/
americanenergynow/AmericanEnergy.pdf).
49. See Bent Ole Gram Mortensen, International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 ENVTL.
& ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 179, 184 (2008).
50. See id. at 184-85.
51. See Nunez, supra note 35, at 155-56.
52. Id. at 156.
53. Rdka Albert et al., Structural Vulnerability of the North American Power Grid,
PHYSICAL REV. E, Feb. 2004, at 025103-1, -2.
54. Scott V. Heck, Note, Lights Outfor New Jersey: TheAugust 2003 Blackout andthe End
ofElectricity Regulation in New Jersey, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 279, 285 (2004).
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adding transmission capacity would indirectly reduce dependence on foreign
energy, as substantial commercial growth of wind energy is not feasible
without considerable expansion of the current transmission infrastructure.55
Accordingly, the addition of sizable transmission capacity to make widespread
wind production tenable could pacify concerns relating to national security by
reducing the risk of widespread power failures and increasing the use of
domestic energy.
3. Boosting Rural Economies
Because of the vast amount of land required to house wind farms," large-
scale wind projects are ordinarily erected in rural areas." Rural communities,
frequently rendered the victims of a depressed economic reality, stand to gain
considerably from the economic boost accompanying the establishment of a
major wind project."
Wind projects inject revenue and advance rural economies in at least four
ways.59 First, the construction of the wind farm generates employment
opportunities for those living in the rural communities.6 0 Assembling wind
turbines and towers "employs construction workers at an estimated rate of 4.8
job-years" for every megawatt of wind power installed."
Second, a smaller number of permanent jobs would become available for
the maintenance of the wind farms-an increase of particular significance in
rural economies historically facing stunted job growth.62 Estimates suggest
that approximately ten full-time service personnel would be required to
maintain a wind farm containing one hundred megawatts of capacity.63
55. See Melanie McCamrnon, Environmental Perspectives on Siting Wind Farms: Is
Greater Federal Control Warranted?, 17 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 1243, 1249 (2009); see also
Burleson, supra note 39, at 146.
56. Becky H. Diffen, Comment, Energy from Above and Below: Who Wins When a Wind
Farm and Oil & Gas Operations Conflict?, 3 TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 240, 242 (2008).
57. Roy Fuller, Note, Wind Energy Development on BLMLands, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENvTL. L. 613, 620 (2004).
58. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future ofRenewable
Wind Power, 26 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 505, 525 (2008) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Diversifying].
59. See Rosenberg, Finding Ways, supra note 1, at 664-65; see also Windustry, Wind
Basics: Why Wind Energy?, http://www.windustry.org/wind-basics/learn-about-wind-energy/
wind-basics-why-wind-energy/why-wind-energy (last visited June 10, 2010) [hereinafter Wind
Basics: Why Wind Energy?].
60. See Rosenberg, Finding Ways, supra note 1, at 664.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
324 [Vol. 34
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Though this figure may seem marginal at best, the creation of ten permanent
employment positions could have a stunning impact on the individualized
circumstances of remotely located communities because the jobs would occur
in sparsely populated rural areas with "few incoming job opportunities" and
would be distributed over a vast geographic region.' In terms of overall job
creation, estimates suggest that sixteen years of employment and between
fifteen and nineteen jobs are created for every megawatt of installed wind
capacity, again noting that these jobs primarily occur in poverty-stricken rural
communities." In addition to greater availability of employment
opportunities, tribal members enjoy further benefits when the wind farms on
which they work are located on their reservations. In McClanahan v. State
Tax Commission ofArizona," the Supreme Court held that a state may not tax
a tribal member for income earned exclusively on the reservation.6 ' Thus, if
a wind farm is located on an Indian reservation, tribal members of that
reservation employed on the wind farm will not be subject to a state income
tax.
Third, wind farms are conventionally sited on leased land, on which
royalties must be paid to the landowner. In rural areas, such lease payments
could offer invaluable income for landowners otherwise presented with scant
economic alternatives. 69 A further benefit for rural landowners is that wind-
energy development is compatible with many existing land uses, such as
livestock grazing, recreational use, wildlife habitat, and oil, gas, and
geothermal production.o The coexistence of wind production with other
fruitful rural land uses allows rural landowners the opportunity to "enjoy a new
revenue stream that could supplement their existing farm and ranch incomes,
having an additional effect of stabilizing rural populations in areas currently
losing population."" Finally, wind-energy projects can diversify rural
economies, "adding to the tax base and providing new types of income."72
Wind farms also have the potential to add to property values in rural areas
otherwise struggling to attract new industry.
64. Id.
65. Mortensen, supra note 49, at 182-83.
66. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
67. Id. at 165.
68. Rosenberg, Finding Ways, supra note 1, at 663.
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Wind Basics: Why Wind Energy?, supra note 59.
73. Id.
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As nontaxable entities, "adding to the tax base" is not of consequence to
Native American tribes.74 Nevertheless, tribal communities share many
common threads with rural communities. As in rural areas, tribal industry is
"inextricably intertwined" with the land itself.7 $ Any revenue or commerce
capable of being generated through the exploitation of existing resources
provides a gainful advantage to tribal communities, whose available business
opportunities, like those of their rural counterparts, are limited. Not only
would the construction of a wind project on tribal land diversify the economy
and generate profits for the tribal wind owners, it would also create much-
needed employment opportunities for tribal members.
Native Americans represent one of the most poverty-stricken ethnic groups
within the United States, with unemployment rates on reservation lands
exceeding fifty percent.7 6 Although the jobs created through a wind farm are
relatively small in number, they represent industrial opportunities that would
not otherwise be available in areas exceedingly limited in economic
diversity-both rural and tribal communities. Though tribes may not enjoy
every commercial benefit available to traditional rural communities in hosting
a potential wind farm," they nonetheless gain tremendous economic
advantages through the introduction of new industry that accompanies a wind-
project installation within the boundaries of their reservations.
III. Advantages of Wind-Energy Production on Tribal Lands
For a host of reasons, wind production on tribal lands is a particularly
attractive endeavor. Though there remain numerous barriers burdening the
implementation of wind projects on Indian reservations, the weighty
advantages accompanying production on tribal lands incentivize both tribes
and other governments to uncover workable solutions to overcome those
barriers. The three primary benefits to locating a wind project in Indian
Country are the vast resource supply, the ability to avoid the bureaucratic
74, See Dean B. Suagee, Going "Code Green" in Indian Country, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Spring 2009, at 56, 57.
75. Patrice H. Kunesh, A Callfor an Assessment of the Welfare ofIndian Children in South
Dakota, 52 S.D. L. REv. 247, 253 (2007).
76. Therese Bissell, The Digital Divide Dilemma: Preserving Native American Culture
While Increasing Access to Information Technology on Reservations, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& PoL'Y 129, 133 (2004).
77. See Suagee, supra note 74, at 57 (noting that tribes are unable to take advantage of the
Production Tax Credit (PTC) on account of their status as nontaxable entities).
78. See discussion infra accompanying notes 105-91.
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delays encountered in launching off-reservation energy projects, and the tax
incentives enjoyed through the employment of Native American workers.
A. Availability ofResources
Wind speed is paramount to the practicality of siting a wind project in a
given location.79 Tribal land in the Great Plains holds a prodigious potential
for wind projects on account of its extraordinary wind resources.so Twenty-
three tribes hold wind-generating potential in excess of three hundred
gigawatts, an amount "equal to over half of present U.S. installed electrical
capacity."8 The combination of this leviathan wind resource with millions of
acres of unobstructed land makes Indian Country an ideal environment for
erecting a wind farm.82 Recognizing that such a massive economic
opportunity is sitting idle, tribes have identified wind energy as a means of
stabilizing habitually fluctuating revenue streams and have endeavored to
pursue the establishment of wind-energy facilities on their lands in order to
alleviate some of the adverse effects associated with their current economic
circumstances."
B. Evasion of Federal Delays
After satisfying the preliminary requirements in selecting a location for a
wind farm, the project "must undergo a rigorous permitting process at local,
state, and federal levels."" In addition to the fact that wind projects are
subject to local zoning laws," several pieces of environmental legislation also
burden construction of wind-energy projects by placing rigid constraints on the
location and manner of potential wind farms."
79. See Elizabeth A. Ransom, Note, Wind Power Development on the United States Outer
Continental Shelf Balancing Efficient Development and Environmental Risks in the Shadow
of OCSLA, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 465, 497 (2004).
80. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 450.
8 1. Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposalfor a
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 229 (2008) (quoting Winona
LaDuke, Local Energy, Local Power, YES! MAG., Winter 2007, at 26, 26).
82. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 450.
83. Id.
84. Michael C. Barnas, TheAnswer, My Friend, Is Blowing in the Wind: Wind Power-The
Renewable Energy, 50 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 5-1, -21 (2004).
85. See Windustry, Wind Basics: Know Your Land, http://www.windustry.com/wind-
basics/learn-about-wind-energy/wind-basics-know-your-land/know-your-land (last visitedJune
10, 2010).
86. Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power as
an Alternative Energy Source in the UnitedStates: Creative and Comparative Solutions, 27 Nw.
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The appeal of constructing a wind farm on tribal lands is bolstered by the
fact that "tribes constitute sovereign governments within the federal system,"
making it possible for them to evade onerous zoning restrictions mandated by
local governments." As a component of their inherent sovereignty, tribal
governments have the authority to craft their own regulations. 8 This benefits
all parties to a wind transaction, because not only are they exempt from local
or state regulation, but their sovereign status also allows them to bypass many
federal guidelines and procedures customarily imposing "complexity and
delay" on industrial projects." Where a wind-energy project is erected in
Indian Country and tribally managed, modern case law suggests that "the scale
will likely tip in favor of preserving tribal sovereignty and not subjecting such
project to federal regulations."90  In some instances, tribes have even
succeeded in gaining complete regulatory control over environmental matters
for utilities built on their lands, allowing for the circumvention of further
arduous administrative constraints." The federal government's hands-off
approach suggests to private investors that investing in tribal wind projects in
Indian Country lessens "the nuisance of government intervention."92
A related issue concems community reaction to a proposed wind project.
The development of wind energy in rural and residential communities has
triggered a string of nuisance litigation. The "not in my backyard" attitude94
has stifled wind production when local governments have acquiesced to the
sentiments of complaining residents. But it is unlikely that such local
opposition will hamper tribal wind projects. Investors launching renewable-
energy ventures on tribal lands do not face intervention from various echelons
of government and private-interest groups. In tribally managed wind-energy
projects, the only governing body is a single tribal council, allowing project
investors substantially to lower the financial and political risks associated with
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 535, 555 (2007). The list of environmental legislation hampering wind-
energy production includes the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (BGEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), the National Wildlife Refuge Systems Administration Act (NWRSAA), and
the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). Id. at 555-65.
87. Shaw & Deutsch, supra note 29, at IV-A.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at IV-B.
92. Id. at V-A.
93. See Fuller, supra note 57, at 620-21 (citing Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992)).
94. Id. at 617.
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financing a renewable-energy venture.95 A notable correlative is that approval
on the part of the tribal council is "usually accompanied by the approval of the
community."96 Equipped with inherent tribal sovereignty and its attendant
advantages, "'only the availability of the resource and the creativity of the
individuals involved limit the options available to tribal governments.'" 97
C. Tax Incentives via Indian Employment Credits
While Native Americans stand to benefit on numerous levels from housing
wind projects on their lands, outside investors realistically have just as much
to gain. Not only do private investors profit by avoiding a lengthy
governmental permitting process, they also enjoy favorable tax breaks through
employing Native Americans for the wind project. Recognizing the
enterprising nature of capitalist society, "[t]wo magic words sum up one of the
more attractive features for outside investors doing business on Indian lands:
tax incentive.""
Within the Internal Revenue Code is a provision entitled "Indian
employment credit."9 9 The provision, 26 U.S.C. § 45A, gives a twenty-percent
tax break for the wages and health insurance paid by an employer to every
qualified tribal employee. 0 A qualified employee includes a member of an
Indian tribe or his or her spouse, so long as the employee's services are
substantially performed within the Indian reservation and the member or
spouse lives on or near the reservation.''
The minor limitations within the statute are unlikely to prevent a substantial
number of Native American hires for wind projects from being considered
qualified employees. The statute exempts those being paid annual wages in
excess of $30,000, subject to adjustment for inflation. 0 2 In July 2008, the
wage cap was set at $35,000 per year. 0 3 The statute also excludes related
95. See Shaw & Deutsch, supra note 29, at V-A (quoting Craig Goodman, former
President, National Energy Marketers Association).
96. Id.
97. Id. at IV-B (quoting DEAN B. SUAGEE, RENEWABLE ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
OPTIONS FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS (REPP Issue Brief No. 10, May 1998), available at
http://www.repp.org/repppubs/articles/issuebrl0/index ibl0.html).
98. Id. at V-C.
99. 26 U.S.C. § 45A (2006).
100. Id. § 45A(a).
101. Id. § 45A(c)(1).
102. Id. § 45A(c)(2)-(3).
103. Indian Governments and the Tax Code: "Maximizing Tax Incentives for Economic
Development": Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of
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family members and owners of a five-percent-or-greater interest. Because
it is unlikely that the Indian wind-farm workers will be of relation to the
private investors and doubtful that those Indians earning less than $35,000
annually will hold any substantial ownership interests, many Indian employees
working on a wind project on reservation land may potentially meet the criteria
for qualified employees for purposes of the tax exemption.
In addition to the abundant resources found on tribal lands and the
avoidance of federal bureaucratic delays resulting from the sovereign status of
tribal entities, the tax credit further incentivizes private investors to pursue
wind-project opportunities on tribal lands. They receive a twenty-percent
return on wages paid that they would not receive were they to employ non-
Indian workers outside of the physical boundaries of the reservation. Granted,
the tax credit, standing alone, is unlikely to be a decisive project-siting factor.
Nevertheless, when coupled with the other measurable benefits of investing in
wind projects on tribal lands, the tax credit effectively provides a
supplementary impetus for tribal wind endeavors.
IV Barriers to Wind-Energy Production on Tribal Land
While several advantages exist in siting a wind project on Native American
lands, certain impediments may stonewall widespread implementation. To
render wind production on tribal lands practicable and economically viable,
tribes, governments, and private investors must work together to conquer the
hurdles presently frustrating the feasibility of extensive exploitation of tribal
renewable-energy resources. Current cumbersome obstacles include (1) the
capital-intensive nature of sizeable energy ventures, (2) an aging and often
inaccessible transmission infrastructure, (3) the ineligibility of Indian tribes to
qualify for fundamental tax incentives, (4) tribal concerns with respect to the
preservation of tribal sovereignty, (5) the maintenance of the trust relationship
with the federal government, and (6) the intimate connection that Native
Americans share with the lands they inhabit.
A. Up-front Capital Requirements
The typical cost of installing one megawatt of turbine capacity requires
approximately $2 million in capital.os Recognizing that a common size for a
wind project includes one hundred megawatts of capacity, the preliminary cost
Donald Laverdure, Chief Legal Counsel, Crow Nation Executive Branch).
104. 26 U.S.C. § 45A(c)(5)(A)-(B).
105. Ferrell, supra note 14, at 1017.
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of establishing a wind project is formidable. o' Although the initial investment
represents almost the entirety of the necessary funding (because a wind farm
requires little in the way of maintenance costs and no fuel costs),107 Indian
communities do not have such sizeable capital reserves at their disposal.'o As
a result, they are forced to seek out private investors in order to proceed, an
action that can spawn further problems for tribes desiring more managerial
control than financing sponsors might be willing to allow.
The initial costs of launching a wind project include turbines, construction
and interconnection fees, metering equipment, maintenance, and any
consulting services used.109 While the enormous cost of the turbine itself is
prohibitive, factoring in these additional expenditures"' places potential wind
projects even further from the practical reach of tribal entities. Also, because
tribal lands are typically situated in remote places far from access to high-
capacity utility transmission lines, tribal wind projects compel the added
expense of constructing new connective infrastructure."' Bearing in mind that
transmission lines can cost more than one hundred thousand dollars per mile,"l 2
tribal wind ventures appear exorbitantly expensive. As a result of a lack of
tribal access to capital, tribes will remain unable singlehandedly to finance
renewable-energy projects without the assistance of private investors or the
federal government, both of which evoke sovereignty concerns."'
106. Id.
107. Hinman, supra note 11, at 43.
108. See Robert J. Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique Challenges, Unlimited
Potential, 40 Aluz. ST. L.J. 1297, 1327 (2008) (quoting Theresa Julnes, Economic Development
as the Foundation for Self-Determination, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: SELF-GOVERNANCE
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151, 155 (Lyman H. Legters & Fremont J. Lyden eds., 1994)).
109. Windustry, Wind Basics: Know Your Economics, http://www.windustry.org/wind-
basics/learn-about-wind-energy/wind-basics-know-your-economics/know-your-economics (last
visited June 12, 2010).
110. See Windustry, How Much Do Wind Turbines Cost?, http://www.windustry.org/how-
much-do-wind-turbines-cost (last visited June 12, 2010) (noting that the average commercial-
scale wind turbine costs approximately $3.5 million to install) [hereinafter How Much Do Wind
Turbines Cost?].
111. See Rosenberg, Finding Ways, supra note 1, at 666 (describing the difficulty of linking
"remotely located wind power sources" with existing power grids).
112. Shaw & Deutsch, supra note 29, at VI-A.
113. See discussion infra accompanying notes 147-62, 192-242.
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B. Transmission
The ideal location to construct a wind farm is on lands that possess strong
winds and are positioned in close proximity to existing electric-power lines." 4
Unfortunately, on account of the remoteness of many of the sites with the best
wind resources, they are typically situated a great distance from practical
access to transmission."' But if the United States "is ever to distance itself
from fossil-fuel dependency, the immense . . . wind . . . resources that are
typically available in remote areas . . . must be utilized.""' Use of these
isolated wind resources requires the development of transmission capacity that
can "deliver the energy from these remote areas to our big cities and
surrounding suburbs"' 7 -the places that consume the most electricity.
While the construction of considerable transmission access would facilitate
the advancement of wind production in remote areas, the current regulatory
framework presents obstacles that must be overcome in order for remote wind
power to become economically viable. Historically, the policies in place favor
existing traditional electricity generators and are "inherently resistant to new
market entrants" such as renewable-energy sources."'
Four governing policies have stifled the efficacy of wind power and other
renewable resources. First, energy generators have traditionally faced
formidable penalties for failing to satisfy a previously determined delivery
schedule." 9 This regulation was intended to keep providers from limiting
supply at their option, thereby increasing prices.'20 The concern for those
producing variable resources is the inherent difficulty in accurately predicting
potential supply.'2 ' Because wind is susceptible to relatively unpredictable and
rapid fluctuation, it would be unreasonable for wind generators to be expected
to satisfy a pre-determined delivery schedule.
Second, owners and operators of each segment of a transmission line have
traditionally collected access charges for use of their respective segments. 22
114. Joseph 0. Wilson, Note, The Answer, My Friends, Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act:
Proposed Legislation Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWAL. REv. 1775, 1786 (2004).
115. Id.
116. Alborz Nowamooz, Inadequacy of Transmission Lines: A Major Barrier to the
Development ofRenewable Energy, 3 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 176, 179-80 (2008).
117. Id at 180.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 181.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id
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Because many wind-energy projects exist in remote areas, the wind-power
generators must use the transmission systems of multiple owners, paying
access fees to each.123 This practice, known as rate pancaking, 24 penalizes
wind-energy producers by imposing additional discriminatory costs based
solely on the remote location of their generation facilities. 25
Third, it is customary for transmission lines to be "owned by older vertically
integrated companies that are generators of energy themselves," spawning
concerns of conflicts of interest with other energy providers.'26 These
companies charge fixed interconnection rates in the form of tariffs, imposing
unfair burdens on renewable-energy generators, who "have a much smaller
impact on the transmission system."1 27
Last, because of the congestion'2 8 resulting from limitations in transmission
capacity, renewable-energy generators face discrimination in transmission
access.129 Access has traditionally been granted on a "first-come, first-served
basis," and the extant framework consequently discriminates against new
market entrants.' The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) "has
been working to identify these discriminatory policies" and to make the
regulatory structure more conducive to renewable-energy production.'
Although the FERC has been somewhat successful in alleviating the inequities
existing under the prior framework,'3 2 lack of investment in the expansion of
transmission capacity continues to plague the wind-energy industry
(particularly those projects located in remote locations) by thwarting
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also Michael Coyn Mateer, Note, When the Lights Go Out: The Impact of
House Bill 6 on Regional Transmission Organizations and the Reliability of the Power Grid,
12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 775, 793 n. 174 (2004). "'Pancaking' is an industry term" describing
the charges (or "open access tariffs") incurred by energy generators when their power travels
"through areas of the grid owned by different utility companies while on its path to its final
destination." Id. This results in "'pancaked' rates which would have been much lower had the
power traveled a different [i.e., less fractionated] path." Id
125. Nowamooz, supra note 116, at 181.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Mateer, supra note 124, at 813.
128. See Mateer, supra note 124, at 813 (noting that congestion is typically discussed in
terms of "bottlenecks," which occur when more energy is being demanded and produced than
can fit through the available transmission infrastructure, blocking much of the distributed power
from flowing through the lines).
129. See Nowamooz, supra note 116, at 181.
130. Id
131. Id.
132. Id. at 181-82.
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economically viable distribution access.33 For wind production on tribal lands
to become a practicable industrial opportunity, substantial transmission
capacity must be constructed, and the regulatory framework must be revised
to eradicate the practices that have a discriminatory effect on renewable-
energy resources.
C. Tax-Exempt Status ofNative American Tribes
The federal production tax credit (PTC)13 4 is the single most important
incentive for developing an economically viable renewable-energy facility.'
Without the PTC, wind-energy projects in the United States "would not be
economically viable" under the current regulatory framework.' 6 The PTC
provides a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity derived from renewable
resources for the first ten years of a renewable-energy facility's operation.'
The current per-kilowatt-hour credit is set at 2.1 cents, 38 and "[fJor a taxpayer
with a positive tax liability, the electricity production credit is equivalent to a
subsidy that pays the taxpayer for each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced
in addition to the price at which the producer sells the electricity."' 39 The
owner therefore profits from the funds received through the tax credits as well
as from the income generated through electricity sales. Standing alone, the
economic impact of the PTC is remarkable-a relatively small thirty-megawatt
wind farm generates more than $1.6 million per year in tax credits.'4 0
Estimates suggest the PTC has the potential to add as much as seventeen
percent to the profitability of a wind-energy project. 14 1
In order to take advantage of the tax credits, "the owner must have a large,
steady tax liability from non-wind operations that they can offset with the PTC
133. See Darrell Blakeway & Carol Brotman White, Tapping the Power of Wind: FERC
Initiatives to Facilitate Transmission of Wind Power, 26 ENERGY L.J. 393, 421 (2005).
134. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
135. See Rosenberg, Diversifying, supra note 58, at 532.
136. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 455.
137. Rosenberg, Diversifying, supra note 58, at 532.
138. Union of Concerned Scientists, Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy, http://
www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/solutions/big_picturesolutions/production-tax-credit-for.html
(last visited June 12, 2010).
139. Shaw & Deutsch, supra note 29, at III-A (quoting JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
PREsENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX CREDITS FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION
FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES (2005), available at http://www.jet.gov/x-36-05.pdf).
140. See Mark Shahinian, Special Feature, The Tax Man Cometh Not: How the Non-
Transferability of Tax Credits Harms Indian Tribes, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 267, 274 (2007-
2008).
141. Garry et al., supra note 10, at457.
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credits."l4 2 This fact can prove doubly troublesome for tribal wind-farm
owners. First, tribes are non-taxable entities, making them ineligible to receive
the PTC.14 3  Second, even if the tribes hypothetically were able to take
advantage of the tax credits through some particular government agreement,
the impoverished reality of many tribes'" could preclude them from having the
necessary substantial tax liability through alternative tribal commerce to make
realistic and effective use of the tax credits.'45 The inapplicability of the tax
credits to tribal entities thus prevents them from independently participating
in the renewable-energy industry as currently structured.146
D. Tribal Sovereignty
Since the time of European settlement, Native American tribes have fought
for their sovereignty.147 As a result, it is only natural that they would desire
control over their own business ventures. Allowing tribal entities to develop
and own wind-energy projects gives them more control over their resources,
thereby effectively increasing tribal sovereignty.'8 The most effective way for
tribes to control wind-energy development on their land is to develop the wind
projects as a tribal enterprise.14 Although this may be the ideal situation, it
does not comport with present reality, as most large-scale resource
development remains under the management ofnon-Indian companies entering
into leases and other agreements with tribes.' Given the current
142. Shahinian, supra note 140, at 274; see also Chris Sanders, Credit Where Credit Is Due,
74 TENN. L. REv. 241, 247 (2007) (quoting BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS § 32.2.4 (2006)). A tax credit functions to reduce
the amount of federal income tax owed. The credit offsets the tax liability "dollar for dollar."
Id. at 247 (citation omitted). A tax credit is different from a deduction, which reduces only the
income subject to tax. Id.
143. Suagee, supra note 74, at 57.
144. See Bissell, supra note 76, at 133 (noting that a great many tribes face harsh economic
conditions and pervasive poverty).
145. See Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What
Challenges Lie Aheadfor Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity?,
11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 466 (2002) (noting that "with only a few notable exceptions,
the vast majority of tribes and tribal peoples are still utterly impoverished").
146. See Shahinian, supra note 140, at 274.
147. John Fredericks III, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 409 (1999).
148. See Shahinian, supra note 140, at 288.
149. See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1065,
1070 (2008) [hereinafter Royster, Practical Sovereignty].
150. See id. at 1071.
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infrastructure, these agreements are necessary because tribes currently have
neither the capital necessary to finance such costly projects nor the ability to
employ the indispensible tax credits available to taxable entities."'
Concerns about tribal sovereignty can be problematic both for the tribes
themselves and the private investors in the renewable-energy projects.
Because tribes are likely to desire control of the project, it may engender
tension between the tribe and the investors, both of whom may expect to have
decision-making authority-the tribes on account of "owning" the land that
hosts the projects and the investors on account of the capital they provide:
From the outset, tribes and investors need to have a mutual
understanding of the unique issues present, most notably, the tribal
independence that is potentially curbed through influence from a
non-tribal investor working to maximize their [sic] own interest in
the project. This dichotomy between the two entities can create a
more complicated dual ownership structure that must be identified
and addressed by the parties involved from the project's
inception.152
A further concern stemming from these joint business ventures is the
question of how disputes will be resolved.'5 3  "[P]rinciples of sovereign
immunity can complicate legal issues that may arise should private investors
and a tribe disagree on some aspect of a wind facility's construction or
operation."154 The question of whether the tribal, state, or federal courts "will
ultimately have jurisdiction to resolve [such] dispute[s]" holds particular
importance.'" Though the precise jurisdictional determination is outside the
scope of this comment, the question remains an important consideration for
tribes and private investors seeking to form a renewable-energy-project
partnership.
E. Trust Relationship with the Federal Government
Tribes have traditionally played a relatively minor role in energy
development and resource extraction in Indian Country.s' Some tribes
collected royalties from mineral development, but few took the initiative to
151. See Shahinian, supra note 140, at 275.
152. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 454.
153. See id. at 458.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Shaw & Deutsch, supra note 29, at I-B.
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develop the resources themselves.' Tribes today, however, are no longer
resting idle. Shifting federal policy has inspired a change in tribal attitudes on
energy development.' The preliminary factors compelling tribal entities to
re-think their positions on energy development centered on the deregulation
of the natural gas supply, as well as "the recent turmoil in the reconfiguring of
the electricity sector."s' "[T]he federal government's passage of enactments
supporting renewable energy development on reservations" and its concession
of related regulatory power to tribes have been decisive factors in the growth
and investment of renewable-energy projects in Indian Country. 6 0
Some commentators insist that successful tribal economic development in
the renewable-energy market requires the federal government to transition
from a decision-making role to that of a mere advisor.'"' Others assert that the
language of tribal energy resource agreements undermines the guardian-ward
relationship by relieving the federal government of all liability stemming from
energy-development projects.'62 The concerns relating to the maintenance of
the trust relationship will be more easily understood after examining the
enactments themselves (tribal energy resource agreements), discussed in Part
V.
F. Relationship with Nature
The Native Americans' relationship with nature presents a further obstacle
to siting wind projects on tribal lands. Tribal "subsistence, culture, and
spirituality are intimately connected to the lands they inhabit."'6 ' As a result,
tribal governments will weigh the limited negative environmental impacts
accompanying wind-energy projects against the potential benefits "in the
context of their religious, cultural, and traditional frameworks."'" On account
of their intimate relationship with nature, tribes may be less inclined than non-
tribal entities to surrender the pristine landscape of their reservations in
exchange for the affluence attainable from the installation of a wind-power
project. The negative environmental impacts of the wind projects, however,
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 1069.
162. Andrea S. Miles, Connent, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools forAchieving
Energy Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of Federal Environmental
and Trust Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDiAN L. REv. 461, 470-71 (2005-2006).
163. Hand, supra note 25, at 10330.
164. Victoria Sutton, Wind and Wisdom, 1 ENVTL. &ENERGY L.& POL'YJ. 345,351 (2007).
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are negligible when weighed against the attendant advantages,' and the tribes
(many of which are in dire economic straits) may find the possible
environmental harm of even less consequence when factoring in the monetary
benefits. Still, possible negative environmental impacts must be addressed.
Legitimate concerns exist regarding both the construction and operation of
wind-energy projects. The concerns relating to construction center on the
consequences associated with road construction, while those relating to
operation include aesthetics, noise, and avian mortality."'
1. Environmental Impacts of Wind-Farm Construction
Among the noteworthy impacts wind farms could have on rural landscapes,
"extensive road building can be the most significant."'67 If existing roads are
not already in place or are unsuitable for accommodating construction
equipment, "developers must displace massive amounts of soil and construct
roads in hilly terrain typical of most wind-farm sites," compelling even greater
soil depletion.' Additionally, road construction and subsequent use launch
fugitive dust into the air, negatively affecting both air quality and visibility.169
Although some harm to the landscape is inevitable during construction of
wind farms, the negative environmental effects stemming from the vast
amount of land required for these projects can be largely mitigated by
thoughtful planning and design.' 70 To reduce disturbance, developers should
endeavor to build only necessary roads and to minimize the amount of road
grading."' Likewise, developers should place wind facilities on relatively flat
terrain in order to avoid hillside cuts,'72 which have a tendency to exacerbate
existing problems with water erosion and fugitive dust.' In terms of
minimizing land disturbance, it is also advantageous to locate wind-power
165. Id. at 354.
166. See Fuller, supra note 57, at 617-22; see also Gregory M. Adams, Bringing Green
Power to the Public Lands: The Bureau ofLand Management's Authority and Discretion to
Regulate Wind-Energy Developments, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 445, 450-54 (2006); Wang
Mingyuan, Government Incentives to Promote Renewable Energy in the United States, 24
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 355, 357 (2005); Rosenberg, Finding Ways, supra note 1, at
668-69.
167. Adams, supra note 166, at 451.
168. Id
169. Id.
170. See Fuller, supra note 57, at 619.
171. Id
172. Id.
173. Id. at 617.
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facilities near existing infrastructure (including roads and power lines) where
possible,174 though this becomes a particularly arduous undertaking in tribal
regions where existing infrastructure is either limited or entirely nonexistent.
While most noise impacts are contemplated in terms of turbine operation,
"[clonstruction activities pose the largest threat for high levels of noise
because of heavy equipment, traffic, and blasting through geologic formations
to dig the foundations for turbine towers.""' Though the construction noise
will be of a much more finite duration than the operation noise, the noise
created during the construction phase could be especially offensive on
reservation lands, considering the fact that inhabitants of the archetypal
bucolic landscape are unlikely to be accustomed to any persistent amount of
industrial noise. Unfortunately, such noise is unavoidable in any construction
project, and because it would be nearly impossible successfully to mitigate the
noise, complaints surrounding such noise are likely to go unappeased.
2. Environmental Impacts of Wind-Farm Operation
While the aesthetic impact of a wind installation is largely subjective, wind
farms are destined to encounter heightened opposition when placed in areas of
unindustrialized natural beauty. Unfortunately, little can be done to placate
residents who take issue with the appearance of the wind turbines. Local and
tribal governments will be forced to balance the objections of disgruntled
community members against the fiscal and environmental value of regional
wind-farm operation. Because of the ample concomitant advantages, it is
unlikely that governments will be compelled to abandon a proposed wind
project based on aesthetically motivated criticisms.
Those objecting to wind projects on aesthetic grounds are perhaps too
myopic in their opposition. In rural communities likely to be targeted for
wind-farm installation, pervasive poverty often accompanies a paucity of
potential industrial opportunities."' Not only will a wind facility improve the
economic circumstances of the community, but it may very well be the least
repugnant means of doing so. When one considers widespread urbanization
or the construction of air-polluting factories as alternatives, wind farms
suddenly become an attractive option to those wishing to maintain the
ecological integrity of their community without facing endemic destitution.
174. Id. at 619.
175. Adams, supra note 166, at 452.
176. See Peter B. Edelman, Towarda ComprehensiveAntipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond
the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1735 (1993).
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Noise was also a primary concern with early turbine designs.' 7 City and
county governments have responded to the problems associated with wind-
turbine noise by enacting ordinances that prohibit the noise from exceeding a
certain level."' Although such ordinances have encouraged technological
development, yielding quieter turbines,"' the mechanical components of the
wind turbine still produce a limited amount of noise. But, "[t]o put this into
perspective, a wind turbine located 250 meters from a residence is no noisier
than a kitchen refrigerator."' While the "low level of unavoidable
aerodynamic noise" may be more offensive to those in characteristically quiet
rural areas,'"' "wind farm noise will be partly masked by ambient noise such
as that from rustling leaves or grasses" 82-or even the wind itself. In addition,
the likelihood that wind farms will be situated in close proximity to residences
is reduced in such sparsely populated areas. Population density aside, it is
always improvident to place a turbine substantially close to a building, as this
obstructs the free flow of wind, thereby diminishing productivity.' The low
level of noise, coupled with the improbability of finding numerous contiguous
residences in rural areas and the imprudence of situating a turbine near
obstruent structures, thus makes it unlikely that local and tribal governments
will terminate a proposed wind project based solely on grievances concerning
the potential for noise disturbances.
Avian mortality is perhaps the most commonly associated consequence of
wind-energy development.'" The concerns may be unsubstantiated, however,
as research indicates that the number of associated bird deaths are negligible
when compared to other causes of avian mortality.'"' Estimates suggest wind
177. Brisman, supra note 7, at 75 (quoting AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, THE MOST
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT WIND ENERGY 16 (2002), available at http://www.
awea.org/pubs/documents/faq2002%20-%20web.pdf).
178. Fuller, supra note 57, at 620.
179. Id.
180. Brisman, supra note 7, at 75 (quoting AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, supra note 174). For
those who are not metric-savvy, 250 meters is approximately equal to 820 feet.
181. See Adams, supra note 166, at 452.
182. Brisman, supra note 7, at 76 (quoting ARI REEVES, WIND ENERGY FOR ELECTRIC
POWER 17 (REPP Issue Brief, July 2003), available at http://www.repp.orgfarticles/static/l/
binaries/wind%20issue%20brief_FINAL.pdf).
183. See Thaddeus Baria, Comment, Up the Creek with a Paddle: Water Doctrine as a Basis
for Small Wind Energy Resource Rights, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 141, 167 (2009) (noting that "a
building situated on neighboring property can disrupt airflow for a distance of twenty times its
height").
184. Adams, supra note 166, at 452-53.
185. See Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the
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turbines are responsible for less than 0.003% of bird deaths.'" The statistics
relating to other causes of avian mortality provide some perspective. While
collisions with buildings may cause nearly one billion fatalities each year and
attacks by cats account for hundreds of millions of casualties, wind turbines
are responsible for only an estimated 33,000 annual bird deaths.' Despite the
low numbers of deaths associated with wind turbines, any level of avian
mortality may be of greater consequence to tribes, who view the issue in light
of cultural, religious, and historical significance.' 8 It is noteworthy that a
sizeable portion of the birds killed are birds of prey or raptors-a class that
includes the eagle,' which is a symbol of religious significance to many
Native Americans. 9 0
Because terminating all tribal wind projects is not a judicious resolution, the
objective becomes one of mitigation. Evidence indicates that bird deaths can
be mitigated by locating facilities distant from areas with high raptor
populations 9 '-an undertaking that can be accomplished through thoughtful
planning in the initial land-assessment studies. A second mechanism to
alleviate the high rate of avian mortality is to position the facilities away from
the migratory paths of birds of prey, another task realistically practicable
through meticulous planning during the preliminary land-assessment phase.
Because avian mortality can be largely mitigated through careful planning
during the pre-construction phases of wind development, it is unlikely, when
weighed against the potential for substantial capital gain, that the relatively
negligible associated casualties will prevent a proposed wind project from
taking shape.
V The Current Design of Tribal Wind-Energy Projects
With the current regulatory and legal framework, wind projects on tribal
lands are rendered attractive and practical through a combination of tribal
energy resource agreements and a specific type of arrangement with private
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1172 (2008).
186. AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, WIND ENERGY AND WILDUFE (2009), available at http://
www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Wind EnergyandWildlifeMar09.pdf.
187. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 185, at 1172.
188. Sutton, supra note 164, at 351.
189. Victoria Sutton & Nicole Tomich, Harnessing Wind Is Not (by Nature)
Environmentally Friendly, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 91, 95 (2005).
190. Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v.
Native American Free Exercise ofReligion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 774-75 (1995).
191. Fuller, supra note 57, at 622.
No. 2] 341
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
investors. Although the strategy is not without flaws, it exists as a present
means for tribes and investors jointly to pursue wind projects on reservation
lands absent a change in the regulatory structure.
A. Tribal Energy Resource Agreements
The Nonintercourse Act of 1834 required federal consent for any lease or
other conveyance of Indian trust land to be valid.' Title V of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005'" essentially eliminates the federal-consent requirement,
allowing tribes to bypass Secretarial approval of certain energy-related
arrangements through the use of a tribal energy resource agreement (TERA).194
The Act permits tribes to enter into leases for up to thirty years for
"generation, transmission, and distribution ofelectric power" without requiring
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.' 5 To enter into such leases, a
tribe drafts a TERA and submits it to the Secretary. 9
The TERA must include provisions regarding: (1) how to ensure
acquisition of necessary information from the applicant for the
lease, business agreement or right-of-way; (2) the term,
amendments and renewals of agreements; (3) economic return to
tribes; (4) technical or other relevant requirements; (5)
environmental review; (6) compliance with all applicable
environmental laws; (7) identification of final approval authority;
(8) public notification of final approval of any business agreement;
(9) consultation with any affected state concerning potential off-
reservation impacts and (10) remedies for breach of any lease,
agreement or right-of-way.'97
In addition, the TERA must delineate the Secretary's duty to conduct periodic
reviews to ensure the tribes' compliant performance under the terms of the
192. Judith Royster, Indian Natural Resources Development: Tribal Energy Resource
Agreements Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, ABA TRENDS, May-June 2006, at 8, 8
[hereinafter Royster, Indian NaturalResources Development]. The terms ofthe Nonintercourse
Act are contained in 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).
193. 25 U.S.C. § 3504.
194. Royster, Indian Natural Resources Development, supra note 192, at 8.
195. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a); see also Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal
Trust Responsibility with Self-Determination ofIndian Tribes: Reflections on Development of
the Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FoUND.
Special Ed., Nov. 2005, at ch. 13-A, III-C.
196. Chambers, supra note 195, at ch. 13-A, III-C.
197. Id.
342 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss2/4
COMMENTS
TERA.'" The Secretary must approve or disapprove the TERA within 270
days of receiving it, after providing for a period of public notice and
comment.'" The Secretary is required to approve a proposed TERA if he
determines that the TERA includes all required provisions and that the tribe
has sufficient capacity to regulate resource development on their land. 20 0 After
a TERA is approved, all agreements falling under the TERA are no longer
subject to federal action.201
Three primary concerns exist with respect to TERAs. The first is that the
TERA scheme "eliminates the federal guarantees of... environmental review
from energy development decisions in Indian Country." 20 2 Because no federal
action would occur, the environmental-review protections mandated under the
National Environmental Protection Act would be lost.20 3 Congress added an
environmental-review process to the TERA model due to concerns that tribes
could ignore other federally mandated environmental-review procedures.204
Under this review process, tribes must identify and evaluate any substantial
environmental impacts associated with the lease.205 Tribes must also identify
ways to mitigate negative environmental impacts and subsequently incorporate
these measures into the TERA.206 Tribes must further provide an opportunity
for public notice and comment, as well as "tribal oversight of energy
development activities by other parties to the instruments to ensure
compliance" with the terms of the TERA and its concomitant environmental
safeguards.2 07
With the myriad conditions that the tribes must satisfy under this strict
environmental-review process, concerns surrounding tribes' ability to launch
environmentally improvident energy projects have been considerably allayed.
The tribes, however, have not been so enthusiastic about the environmental-
review requirements.20 8 Because the federal government was essentially
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Miles, supra note 162, at 470.
203. Id. at 471 (quoting Oversight Hearing to Review the Permitting of Energy Projects:
Before the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (prepared testimony of
Sharon Buccino, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council)).
204. Id. at 472.
205. Royster, Indian Natural Resources Development, supra note 192, at 9.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 1090.
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mandating action on the part of tribal governments without providing financial
resources with which to conduct the compulsory environmental reviews, there
was some tribal opposition to the environmental-review process. 209 Despite
such tribal opposition, the environmental-review process remains in effect.
The second concern involves the reduced trust responsibility under TERAs.
Title V of the Energy Policy Act requires that the Secretary act in the best
interests of the tribes and in good-faith conformity with the federal trust
responsibility and further asserts that "nothing in the act absolves the federal
government of its trust responsibilities."2"o But Title V paradoxically also
absolves the federal government of liability to tribes or other parties to the
lease for any attendant losses "so long as the instrument was entered into in
accordance with an approved [TERA]."211
Although the Secretary is required to approve a TERA if he deems that all
requirements have been satisfied, the determination is a subjective one. Such
a scheme, "wherein a cabinet Secretary has prescriptive control over decisions
regarding Indian energy development, but no subsequent liability, is an
abdication of the federal trust responsibility that is patently unfair to tribes."2 12
Tribes have expressed concem that they are being saddled with the onerous
costs of energy development without adequate resources to carry such costs. 2 13
They are forced to "absorb the costs-both direct and indirect-of preparing
TERAs, negotiating leases, . . . conducting environmental reviews, and
responding to challenges by 'interested parties."'
21 4
In addition to bearing the costs, tribes are also obliged to shoulder liabilities
in the event that difficulties arise.2 15 The protections theoretically unfailingly
afforded to tribes through the federal government's trust responsibility are
eradicated under TERAs. Under Title V of the Energy Policy Act, "the
judicially defined trust doctrine appears to have little room within which to
209. Id.
210. Royster, Indian Natural Resources Development, supra note 192, at 9 (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A) (2006)).
211. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(D)).
212. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 1099 (quoting Tribal Energy Self-
Sufficiency Act and the Native American Energy Development and Self-Determination Act:
Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 107 (2003)
(supplemental statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation) [hereinafter Hearings]).
213. Id.
214. Id. "The federal statute defines an 'interested party' as a person or entity that will
sustain or has sustained an adverse environmental impact because the tribe failed to comply
with its TERA." Id. at 1095.
215. Id. at 1099.
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operate." 2 16 If the TERA system is to be kept in place, its tenets must be re-
examined in order to ensure that the federal trust responsibility remains on
steady ground. This would require the federal government to afford to tribal
entities some degree of protection in the event of conflict under the lease,
rather than the current reprieve from all liability.
Logic would suggest that the current eschewal of the trust responsibility
would be accompanied by an increase in tribal self-determination. But TERAs
effectively undermine tribal sovereignty. They essentially authorize
imposition on tribal sovereignty on account of the various opportunities for
public input.2 17 Not only is the proposed TERA itself subject to public input,
but the Secretary must also consider the public comments in deciding whether
to approve the TERA, and the tribe must provide an opportunity for public
input on final approvals of leases or other resource-development
instruments.218
Further, the tribe is obligated to afford an opportunity for public notice and
comment concerning its environmental-review process and respond to such
comments prior to approval."' The TERA applicants are essentially at the
mercy of potentially cantankerous community members throughout the
approval process. Even after the TERA is approved, the tribes remain
figurative hostages to belligerent local residents, who "may, after exhausting
tribal remedies, petition the Secretary to review the tribe's compliance with its
TERA."9220
The irony of the public-review process is that it serves to protect states, non-
tribal local governments, and non-tribal local residents at the expense of tribal
self-governance. The trust doctrine is intended to shelter tribes from outside
interference, yet the public-review process under the TERA system essentially
encourages the very outside interference against which the trust doctrine is
intended to protect. The TERA provisions basically propose "the elimination
of Secretarial approval in exchange for the promulgation of tribal regulations
that not only require consultation with State officials, but also require public
notification and comment processes and ultimately, private citizen challenges"
of leases approved under the TERA system. 221 The federal trust responsibility
216. Lynn H. Slade, The Federal Trust Responsibility and Tribal-Private Natural Resource
Development, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. Special Ed., Nov. 2005, at ch. 13B, III-A-3.
217. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 1086.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 212, at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford, Shipps
& Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe)).
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and traditional notions of tribal sovereignty are intended to protect tribes
against incursion into tribal decision-making both by state governments and
non-members, 222 but such protections are lost under the public-notice-and-
comment process.
In essence, the regulations ask tribes to relinquish "fundamental aspect[s]
of sovereignty in exchange for the elimination of Secretarial approval,"223 yet
the public-comment and TERA-approval requirements themselves may be
more stringent than those encountered if traditional Secretarial approval
remained intact. In the course of TERA review, "the Secretary may take any
action necessary to protect the asset, including re-assuming responsibility for
the development of tribal energy resources."2 4 Not only is the Secretary able
to deny an application based on his own subjective belief regarding tribal
competence, but he is also given unbridled discretion completely to divest the
tribe of its interest in the project. The copious restrictions placed on the tribes,
coupled with the limitless discretion of the Secretary, effectively suffocate
tribal sovereignty despite the intended goal of fostering tribal self-
determination.225
Notwithstanding the profound shortcomings of the TERA structure, TERAs
remain instrumental in facilitating tribal energy projects within the confines
of the current regulatory framework. If the current abuses can be mitigated
through appropriate legislative action targeting the rampant governmental
encroachment within the existing TERA structure, TERAs could stimulate
massive growth of tribal energy development, resulting in an amelioration of
tribal economic welfare.
B. The Flip Model
Recognizing that the deficiencies of the TERA model need to be addressed
before TERAs can provide an attractive avenue for tribal energy production,
the aptly named flip model provides a means by which tribes can take
advantage of the PTC and thus render wind projects on tribal lands
economically viable. To be eligible to receive the PTC, one must be a
taxpayer producing electricity.226 To qualify as a producer, "a taxpayer must
222. Id. at 1086-87 (quoting Hearings, supra note 212, at 159 (statement of Maynes,
Bradford, Shipps & Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe)).
223. Id. at 1087 (quoting Hearings, supra note 212, at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford,
Shipps & Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe)).
224. Scot W. Anderson, Energy Development on Indian Lands: Title Vofthe Energy Policy
Act of2005, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. Special Ed., Oct. 2005, at ch. 6 (emphasis added).
225. See Miles, supra note 162, at 472.
226. Hinman, supra note 11, at 59.
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have an ownership interest in the qualifying electricity facility," something
problematic for wind-energy developers, as it customarily takes several years
before a wind farm proves profitable.227 In the absence of other commercial
enterprises producing sufficient income to make use of the tax credits, the PTC
provides only a negligible benefit to developers in the initial years of a
facility's operation.228 Such a "financial reality has led to complex partnership
agreements that allow the developer to monetize the PTC or effectively sell the
tax benefit to an investor." 229 The result is that the investor acquires an
ownership interest in the qualifying wind-energy facility, giving the investor
eligibility for receipt of PTC benefits.230
The statute governing the PTC231 instructs a partnership to allocate the PTC
proportionate to each partner's ownership interest.23 2  This permits the
developer to structure the financing arrangement in the form of a partnership
whereby a majority of the partnership interest is allocated to the private
investors, allowing the majority of the PTC to be directed to them.233 Under
such an agreement, a tribe can allocate majority ownership interest to the
private investor, and the PTC is applied to that portion of the ownership.
In the standard flip model, the private investor owns ninety-nine percent of
the project during the first ten years of project operation, while the PTC is in
place.234 After the tax credits expire, "the project is 'flipped' (i.e., sold) to the
tribe."2 35 Over the course of three years, the tribe essentially re-purchases the
project from the private investor in an arms-length, fair-market-value
transaction.236 Afterward, the tribe owns ninety-nine percent of the project.237
A concern with such an arrangement is that the ownership structure "conflicts
with the tribes' desire to own the resource projects on their lands" and may
therefore undermine tribal sovereignty. 238 Because the agreement allocates
majority ownership to the outside investor, the tribe may fear that the investor
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
232. Hinman, supra note 11, at 59.
233. Id.
234. Shahinian, supra note 140, at 279.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 280.
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would accordingly expect majority decision-making capacity, which cuts
against tribal goals of commercial self-sufficiency.
An adaptation of the standard flip model that serves to pacify the tribal-
sovereignty concerns is known as the Minnesota flip, "which is structured so
that the [tribe] can 'own' 1% of the project in a cash flow sense but retain . .
. majority voting rights," effectively furnishing the tribe with the control
absent in the standard flip model.239 Under this model, ownership later flips
to the tribe in the same manner as under the standard flip model.240 While the
Minnesota flip model provides tribes with greater autonomy, it may cause
concern for private investors. Private investors have expressed reluctance to
enter into partnership agreements requiring them to supply ninety-nine percent
of the initial capital in order to gain ninety-nine percent of the cash flow, while
simultaneously exposing them to the risks attendant to minority-ownership
status. 241
While such a solution has yet to be advocated, parties under either model
may be conciliated if decision-making terms were to be established outright,
with specified mandatory responses to a variety of foreseeable events. For
example, the parties could contractually stipulate that no funds are to be
allocated to road construction for the siting of additional turbines after the
initial project has been established. Such a provision would establish a certain
outcome in advance, rather than permitting the party with the superior
ownership interest to determine that outcome later. Pre-determined responses
to foreseeable events will not solve every problem, however, as unforeseeable
events are largely unavoidable. But such premeditated decision-making may
provide some relief to parties faced with the perceived lack of control
accompanying minority-ownership status. The action to be taken in the case
of an unforeseeable event would continue to depend on whether the standard
or Minnesota flip were in place, as this designation would dictate which party
held the ultimate decision-making capacity.
Though it remains difficult within the current system to satisfy both parties
under a given flip model, both models are nevertheless instrumental in
allowing tribes and those investing in tribal wind projects to take advantage of
the PTC. Under the present regulatory framework, employing the PTC is of
"paramount importance" to the economic viability of a wind project on tribal
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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lands, "and, consequently, ownership agreements must be structured to
trigger" such incentives.242
C. Remaining Concerns
The TERAs provide tribes with increased independence in their dealings
once they have overcome the plethora of hurdles associated with the
application process. The flip model provides an additional apparatus by which
the tribe can facilitate the construction of wind projects on their land. Still,
there exist peripheral obstacles frustrating the potential for widespread
implementation of wind projects on tribal lands.
Neither the TERA nor the flip model addresses the lack of access to
transmission or the pervasive discriminatory practices within the distribution
industry. Since building extensive transmission capacity remains prohibitively
expensive, even for private investors with substantial assets, any functional
proposal for wind projects on tribal lands should include government
assistance in expanding the transmission infrastructure. The government has
already expressed its intent to expand transmission capacity243 in light of
concerns relating to energy security-all that is required is a driving force to
set the plan in motion. To this end, the so-called German model may provide
the foundation for a system offering, at a minimum, protections equivalent to
those afforded by way of TERAs and the flip model, as well as tackle the
obstacles the current schemes fail to address.
VI. Adopting and Adapting the German Model
The system implemented in Germany to encourage renewable-energy
growth is the feed-in tariff, which has been hailed as "the world's most
successful policy mechanism for stimulating the rapid development of
renewable energy."2" Under the feed-in tariff model, wind-energy capacity
has expanded at an annual rate of seventy percent over the past decade.245 The
advantages enjoyed under the German system include, but are not limited to,
"effective induced expansion of wind power, lower prices than quota systems,
242. Garry et al., supra note 10, at 455.
243. See Burleson, supra note 39, at 146 (noting that the Department of Energy has called
for transmission investment of $60 billion through 2030).
244. Paul Gipe, Electricity Feed Laws, Feed-in Laws, Feed-in Tariffs, Advanced Renewable
Tariffs, and Renewable Energy Payments, http://www.wind-works.org/articles/feedlaws.html
(last visited June 30, 2010).
245. Susan Perera, Note, Following Minnesota's Renewable Energy Example: Will Federal
Legislation Fly High or Flap in the Wind?, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 949, 965 (2008).
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avoidance of windfall gains, and equal incentives for small and medium-sized
market participants as large market competitors."24 6 By combining the
successful elements of the German model with other gainful policy
mechanisms, wind energy can become a nascent force in both the American
electrical industry and tribal economies.
A. Feed-in Tarifs
Feed-in tariffs operate such that any renewable-energy generator is
guaranteed the right to receive long-term payments for every kilowatt hour of
electricity sent to the grid.247 The feed-in tariff has three key elements: "a
guaranteed grid connection, a long term contract, and a fixed price sufficient
[to provide] for a reasonable return on investment."24 8
The feed-in tariffs require that every utility connect and give priority to all
renewable-energy sources, "using that energy first, rather than producing its
own."249 By requiring utilities to provide grid connection to all renewable-
energy generators, the feed-in tariff system eliminates the discriminatory
practices historically in place, which operate under a first-in-time approach.250
Providing grid connection, however, may not be such a simple endeavor. In
remote locations, grid connection is often not feasible without the construction
of new transmission capacity. 251' The most favorable way of approaching this
problem is to require that utilities and developers share interconnection and
infrastructure-upgrade costs in isolated areas.252 Of course, if the federal
government were to fulfill its stated intentions of widespread expansion of
246. Christopher W. Fry, Comment, Harvesting the Sky: An Analysis of National and
International Wind Power, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 427, 445 (2008).
247. Ben Block, North American Feed-in Tariff Policies Take Off WORLDWATCH INST.,
Aug. 12, 2009, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/622 1.
248. John Farrell, Feed-in Tariffs in America: Driving the Economy with Renewable Energy
Policy That Works, NEW RULEs PROJECT, Apr. 2009, at 6, http://www.newrules.org/sites/
newrules.org/files/feed-in%20tariffs%20in%20america.pdf
249. Brad A. Kopetsky, Comment, Deutschland OberAlles: Why German Regulations Need
to Conquer the Divided US. Renewable-Energy Framework to Save Clean Tech (and the
World), 2008 Wis. L. REV. 941, 979.
250. See Nowamooz, supra note 116, at 181.
251. See Christopher E. Cotter, Comment, Wind Power and the Renewable Portfolio
Standard: An Ohio Analysis, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 405, 409 (2007).
252. TOBY COUTURE&KARLYNNCORY, NAT'LRENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, STATE
CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES ANALYSIS (SCEPA) PROJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
FEED-IN TARIFFS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009).
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transmission capacity,253 neither the utilities nor the developers would be
forced to shoulder this burden.
The feed-in tariff contract provides renewable-energy generators with
guaranteed per-kilowatt-hour payments for a definite period of time, often
twenty years.254  Utilities must buy electricity from renewable-energy
generators at incentivized rates for the twenty-year period.255 This long-term
contract provides renewable-energy-project owners with stability and
certainty.256 By offering such contracts, feed-in tariff policies assure stable
revenue streams, reducing the risks characteristic of renewable-energy
investments while simultaneously reducing the overall costs of financing a
renewable-energy project. 257 The "long-term price security . . . remove[s]
many barriers to rapid [renewable-energy] development, creating conditions
conducive to market growth."258
Within the long-term contracts is the guarantee of a fixed price above
market rates.259  To guarantee that developers enjoy profitable returns,
"[p]ayments are set at pre-established rates, often higher than what the market
would ordinarily pay."260 The guaranteed pricing encourages development by
creating "a low-risk investment environment" 261 and allows individuals and
rural communities "to compete with utilities and large developers by requiring
utilities to pay a fair price for [renewable] energy put into the grid by
anyone." 262
Guaranteed pricing also gives rise to the tangential effect of increased
market competition, which occurs as a result of ownership diversity. The
market structure under the feed-in tariff system "creates the mass markets and
economies of scale necessary to drive down the cost of [renewable-energy
resources]."263 Instead of the current American system where the different
253. See Burleson, supra note 39, at 146 (noting that the Department of Energy has called
for transmission investment of $60 billion through 2030).
254. KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, FEED-IN TARIFF
POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 2 (2009).
255. Farrell, supra note 248, at 14.
256. COUTURE & CORY, supra note 252, at 17.
257. Id. at 31.
258. Id.
259. Barnas, supra note 84, at 5-19.
260. Block, supra note 247.
261. Cristin Cavanaugh, Book Note, 19 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 68, 72 (2008)
(reviewing JOSEPH SZARKA, WIND POWER IN EUROPE: POLITICS, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY
(2007)) (quoting Szarka).
262. Perera, supra note 245, at 972.
263. Bradford Plumer, Clean Break, AUDUBON, Mar.-Apr. 2009 (article contained in
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types of energy sources and project sizes battle one another for the lowest bid,
the feed-in tariff system stimulates competition "among developers and
manufacturers to reduce prices to maximize their welfare."2" The result of
such a market scheme is "less expensive renewable energy"2 65 and the potential
for less expensive electricity altogether.2%
By eliminating the need for the PTC, the feed-in tariff system should prove
particularly attractive to tribes. Under the feed-in tariff model, the profits
come from utility revenues. 267 As a result, this system avoids the nuisance of
"cobbl[ing] together an unwieldy structure of local investors and tax equity
investors" necessary under the American system to make use of the PTC.268
Because prices are set at a rate that guarantees cost recovery as well as a
reasonable profit, renewable-energy producers "need not rely on attracting the
relatively few individuals or corporations with large amounts of tax liability"
to defray the costs.2 69 Under a feed-in tariff system, "there's no negotiating
with utilities, partnering with tax-credit-hungry investors, or uncertainties
about Congress."270
The feed-in tariff system inspires a fairer market by removing the "barriers
to participation" from minority players.27' It provides an avenue by which
individuals with nominal tax liability, such as farmers, as well as non-taxable
entities, such as tribal nations, may independently pursue renewable-energy
projects.272 The elimination of the need for the PTC and its associated
partnership structures is encouraging for tribes that were uncomfortable with
the rescission of their sovereignty that accompanied the schemes employed in
order to take advantage of the PTC. Under this new system, tribes are afforded
unnumbered pull-out section between pages 20 and 25).
264. Farrell, supra note 248, at 25.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 19.
267. Id. at 21.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 13.
270. Id. at 14; see also Hinman, supra note 11, at 64 (noting that the 2008-2009 recession
and congressional action have led to a decrease in wind-energy capital). The "uncertainties
about Congress" are in reference to the PTC. The PTC is not of an indefinite duration.
"Congress has consistently allowed the PTC to expire, only to renew it, causing boom and bust
cycles in the wind industry." Lisa Chavarria, Wind Power: Prospective Issues, 68 TEX. B.J.
832, 834 (2005). Projects proliferate when the PTC is in place, followed by a near-cessation
in project growth when it expires. The current PTC is set to expire in 2013. See 26 U.S.C. §
45(d)(1) (2006).
271. Farrell, supra note 248, at 14.
272. Id.
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singular ownership and decision-making authority, as they no longer must
allocate ownership rights to outside parties in order to profit from the tax
incentives.
Unfortunately, although the feed-in tariff system offers countless attractive
features for making tribal wind projects feasible, it does not decrease the
amount of up-front capital required.273 Though the higher rate of return for
renewable power over a fixed period of years helps to defray the initial cost of
the equipment,274 tribes are unlikely to have such capital at the outset. In order
to make this system more conducive to tribal ventures, tribes will have to
acquire loans (though less sizeable than those required under alternate
schemes) from private investors, or else the federal government will have to
provide grants to encourage wind production on tribal lands. Loans from
private investors will not have the same onerous effects as do the partnership
structures under the PTC because the tribes will not be required to allocate
ownership interests to the private investors. The loan method allows tribes to
acquire the up-front capital without compromising their desire for exclusive
ownership.2 75
Grants from the federal government present another practical option,
provided that such grants are not conditioned in any way that could engender
further deprivation of tribal sovereignty. If the federal government had
subjective decision-making authority or retained any form of ownership
interest in the project after the grant had been paid to the tribe, the same
sovereignty issues would arise as are present in the TERA model and the
partnerships with private investors. To encourage the growth of wind energy
on tribal lands, any grants from the federal government should be free from
any potential coercive influence.
273. CORY ET AL., supra note 254, at 11.
274. Kate Galbraith, Europe's Way ofEncouraging Solar Power Arrives in the US., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at Bl.
275. On account of the nature of ownership in Indian Country, tribes confront unique
barriers in acquiring private loans. The federal government owns fee title to all Indian lands
held in trust, with the Indians retaining a right of occupancy. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Because lenders are invariably wary of granting unsecured loans,
tribes and their members may confront difficulty in acquiring private loans since homes and
other buildings on trust land cannot serve as reliable collateral. See Yair Listokin, Confronting
the Barriers to Native American Homeownership on Tribal Lands: The Case of the Navajo
Partnershipfor Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 440 (2001). In order to secure private loans, tribes
and their members must therefore possess alternate collateral of sufficient value to satisfy the
loan.
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B. Renewable Portfolio Standards
While many governments have taken an "either/or" approach to feed-in
tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, it has been suggested that the two are
capable of harmonious co-existence-and may in fact be entirely
complementary."' A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requires that a set
percentage of a retail electricity supplier's energy come from renewable
sources.27 7 The set percentage often starts low and gradually escalates over
time, spurring steady growth in the overall renewable-energy supply.278 To
satisfy the requirement, retail electricity suppliers must provide the governing
body with sufficient renewable-energy credits (RECs) at the end of a
regulatory period to establish compliance with the standard. 2 79 Each REC
"certifies that a unit of electricity (e.g., a kilowatt hour) has been generated
from a qualified renewable source." 280 Retail electricity providers have the
luxury of choosing the most efficient way to meet the RPS requirement.2 8 1
They may obtain RECs either by producing the renewable energy themselves
or by purchasing the RECs from another electricity supplier that has produced
in excess of its obligation.282
The establishment of a successful RPS requires six elements. The RPS
must (1) specify the percentage of renewable electricity and applicable time
frame, (2) determine which technologies qualify as renewable, (3) identify
who is required to provide or obtain the renewable energy, (4) determine
whether the standard will include RECs, (5) designate an agency to oversee
and administer the standard, and (6) set penalties for utilities that fail to meet
their obligation.283
The RPS will further the successes of a feed-in tariff system. It provides
long-term certainty for wind energy by assuring that a certain amount of
electricity is generated from renewable resources. This long-term
predictability enables wind-project owners to "attract investment capital and
achieve manufacturing economies of scale that will spur economic
development, lower consumer prices, strengthen U.S. energy security, and help
276. See COUTURE & CORY, supra note 252, at 24.
277. Emily Kennedy, Federal Regulations, Incentives, and Funding ofRenewable Energy
in 2006, 1 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 403, 404 (2007).
278. Kopetsky, supra note 249, at 958.
279. Id.
280. Robin J. Lunt, Comment, Recharging U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 371, 383 (2006-2007).
281. Id. at 382-83.
282. Kopetsky, supra note 249, at 958.
283. Lunt, supra note 280, at 381-82.
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our environment." 2' The RPS also diversifies the energy supply by
developing domestic renewable energy, which functions "to shield consumers
from spikes in energy prices" accompanying the volatile foreign energy
market.285 Last, by encouraging the rapid growth of renewable energy, the
RPS will generate employment opportunities and "increase[] income across the
country, especially in economically hard-pressed rural areas,"286 which include
many tribal lands. Because each large utility-scale wind turbine erected
generates over $2 million in economic activity,287 the potential impact on rural
and tribal communities would be stunning.
As sovereign nations, tribes will not be subject to the federally mandated
REC-generation requirements that other retail electricity suppliers must satisfy.
But the tribes will still be capable of selling RECs generated through their
facilities in order to assist other suppliers in meeting their obligations. The
RPS will thus assist the tribes in accelerating the timeframe within which the
tribes will be able to realize profits by providing supplemental income with
which to repay any loans acquired for project development.
C Net Metering
Though not applicable to large utility-scale wind farms on tribal lands, net-
metering agreements are invaluable to tribal groups using small wind projects
to power their homes or business facilities. Under a net-metering agreement,
wind-turbine owners are interconnected with a local utility that allows the
wind-turbine owners to return excess electricity to the utility when their
systems produce more power than they use and allows them to draw power
from the utility in times of underproduction.8 In essence, net metering allows
the interconnected wind-turbine owner "to use the electrical grid as a storage
battery."289 Thus, similar to feed-in tariffs and RPS implementation, net
metering demands transmission access, which in turn requires widespread
expansion of the current transmission infrastructure.
Under net metering, when a tribe produces more power than it consumes,
"the electric meter runs backwards generating credits."290 When the tribe "uses
284. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, RENEWABLE ELEcTIucyry STANDARD (RES), available at
http://www.awea.org/legislative/pdflRES_General.pdf
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Windustry, Net Metering and Net Billing, http://www.windustry.org/net-metering-and-
net-billing (last visited June 30, 2010).
289. Id.
290. STATE ENvTL. REs. CTR., NET METERING, available at http://www.serconline.org/
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more power than is being produced, the meter runs forward normally.""' The
tribes are "charged only for the 'net' power that they consume" from the utility
"accumulated over a designated period or, if their renewable-energy-
generating systems make more electricity than is consumed," the utility may
pay the tribe for the excess electricity contributed to the grid over the same
designated period.292 "Because wind energy is a variable resource, the need
for energy may not align exactly with its availability."29 3 By connecting to the
grid and participating in net metering, a wind-energy producer "can obtain the
full value of the electricity produced on-site without needing expensive battery
storage systems."294
The specific conditions within a net-metering agreement vary by
jurisdiction.295 In order to promote tribal ownership of renewable energy, a
federal net-metering policy should be adopted. In the spirit of promoting
renewable energy and rural prosperity, tribal owners should be compensated
at the retail rate rather than the avoided cost. The retail rate represents the
price of electricity that the utility charges to residential customers.2 96 The
avoided cost represents an estimate of what it would cost the utility to produce
supplementary generation and is lower than the retail rate.2 97
Additionally, the billing cycle should be calculated annually, rather than
monthly, as this reduces administrative costs to the utility and distributes the
relative excesses and shortages over a greater period of time, mitigating
seasonal demand fluctuations. Should an independent generator produce more
energy in a given year than it consumes, that generator should have the option
either to carry the net excess generation over to the following annual billing
period or be compensated for the net excess generation at the retail rate.
All utilities should be required to participate in the federal net-metering
policy. It should be noted that generators are not the only parties to benefit
from net-metering agreements. Utilities benefit when the customer-generators
provide electricity to the grid during peak demand cycles because it improves
netmetering/index.html (last visited June 30, 2010).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, NET METERING, available at http://www.awea.org/pubs/
factsheets/netmetfin-fs.pdf.
294. Id.
295. See Karl R. Rdbago, A Strategy for Developing Stationary Biodiesel Generation, 36
CUMB. L. REv. 461, 476 (2005-2006).
296. How Much Do Wind Turbines Cost?, supra note 110.
297. Id.
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the system load factor. 298  By decreasing the frequency both of billing
statements and meter readings, net metering also reduces administrative
costs. 299 Management of customer-generator facilities, in turn, costs less and
eliminates the need for further regulation once net-metering programs are
established.3" The cost savings to all parties involved, as well as the time
saved by utility companies, make net-metering agreements a constructive
addition to a comprehensive federal policy encouraging renewable energy.
D. Combining the Schemes
Feed-in tariffs, a national RPS, and a federal net-metering system are all
individually propitious. Taken together, they have the potential to make the
United States a global leader in renewable energy by encouraging development
from the ground up. A federal policy including feed-in tariffs, a national RPS,
net metering, and a plan for transmission-infrastructure expansion could solve
those problems facing wind-energy projects on tribal lands that are capable of
resolution while simultaneously making wind production more feasible for
society as a whole.
The first problem facing tribal wind production is the up-front capital
required. The feed-in tariff system reduces the need for such capital as a result
of the economic security provided through the system's stable structure.
Second, by mandating that utilities connect generators to the grid, the feed-in
tariff system, along with net metering, mitigates the rampant abuses and
discrimination historically present in the regulatory structure of the
transmission industry. Third, by revamping the transmission infrastructure,
either by having utilities and developers share in the cost of grid
interconnection and building of new infrastructure in rural areas or through the
establishment of a federal plan whereby the government finances expansion
of the aging transmission infrastructure, it will become feasible for tribal
ventures to connect to utilities. This will allow them gainfully to participate
in a market scheme that employs feed-in tariffs and net metering. Fourth, both
the feed-in tariff and RPS eliminate the need for the PTC by providing stability
298. U.S. DEP'TOFENERGY,NETMETERINGPouCIES, available at http://apps3.eere.energy.
gov/greenpower/markets/netmetering.shtml (last visited June 30,2010); see also Robert Means
& Deborah Cohn, Common Carriage ofNatural Gas, 59 TUL. L. REv. 529, 566 n. 111 (1985)
(quoting AM. GAS Ass'N, REGULATION OF THE GAS INDUSTRY GL-90 (1984)) (noting that "the
load factor is '[t]he ratio of the average requirement [of power usage] to the maximum
requirements [of power usage] for the same time period"').
299. Valerie J. Faden, Net Metering of Renewable Energy: How Traditional Electricity
Suppliers Fight to Keep You in the Dark, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 109, 124 (2000).
300. Id.
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in return profits as well as income through the purchase of RECs, making
partnerships with private investors obsolete. Instead, the relationship that a
tribe will have with investors is that of a borrower, precluding the tribe from
having to relinquish any ownership interest and thereby preserving tribal
economic sovereignty. Fifth, the trust relationship also remains intact because
the tribes will effectively own the project, obviating the need to enter into
leases using a TERA. The only obstacle remaining is the tribe's relationship
with nature. Unfortunately, no federal policy capable of solving this problem
could be constructed, so the solution remains one of mitigating the negative
environmental effects to the greatest extent possible.
VII. Conclusion
Within Indian Country, the United States enjoys the potential for
widespread expansion of wind-energy production. The positive impact of
reducing harmful pollutants, coupled with the concomitant effects of bolstering
national security and providing a much-needed boost to rural economies,
makes wind-energy projects on Native American land attractive to all parties
involved. Though such projects are presently possible, the current regulatory
framework is fraught with complications.
In order successfully to stimulate extensive development of wind-energy
projects within Indian reservations, a federal policy inspired by the German
model should be enacted that includes a combination of feed-in tariffs, a
national RPS, and net metering, along with a comprehensive plan for
expansion of the currently inadequate transmission infrastructure. Such a
model would be capable of overcoming both the economic and sovereignty
concerns plaguing the system currently in place.
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